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October 3, 2014	  	  Cooperatives	  represent	  an	  alternative	  to	  large-­‐scale	  corporate	  farms	  and	  plantations	  as	  well	  as	  to	  independent	  unaffiliated	  small	  private	  farms.	  This	  paper	  presents	  a	  comparative	  modeling	  narrative	  on	  cooperative	  organizational	  forms’	  potential	  impact	  on	  equitable	  rural	  development.	  This	  speaks	  to	  issues	  of	  both	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  and	  how	  this	  income	  is	  distributed.	  The	  case	  is	  made	  the	  cooperatives	  can	  potentially	  generate	  higher	  rates	  of	  growth	  and	  more	  equitable	  growth,	  even	  in	  competitive	  economic	  environments.	  An	  important	  type	  of	  cooperative	  that	  is	  focused	  upon	  is	  one	  based	  on	  the	  linking	  of	  smaller	  farms	  into	  a	  cooperative.	  Economies	  economics	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  as	  well	  in	  transaction	  costs	  can	  be	  captured	  by	  the	  cooperatives.	  Given	  cooperative	  governance,	  one	  would	  also	  expect	  higher	  levels	  of	  x-­‐efficiency.	  Overall,	  cooperatives	  can	  generate	  relative	  high	  incomes	  to	  cooperative	  members,	  whilst	  remaining	  competitive	  with	  the	  traditional	  privately	  owned	  large	  farms.	  Critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  cooperative,	  is	  a	  set	  rules	  and	  regulation	  that	  place	  them	  on	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  with	  the	  privately	  owned	  farm.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  implementation	  and	  practice	  of	  cooperative	  principles	  is	  key	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  cooperative	  farm	  and	  rural	  cooperatives,	  more	  generally	  speaking.	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1.	  Introduction	  Cooperative	  organizational	  forms	  represent	  an	  alternative	  to	  large-­‐scale	  corporate	  farms	  and	  plantations	  as	  well	  as	  to	  independent	  unaffiliated	  small	  private	  
                                                
1 This	  paper	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  ICA-­‐CCR	  international	  research	  conference,	  Cooperatives	  
in	  Local	  and	  Regional	  Development,	  Pula,	  Croatia,	  June	  25-­‐28,	  2014.	  	  It	  was	  also	  presented	  as	  a	  keynote	  address	  to	  the	  9th	  ICA-­‐AP	  Cooperative	  Research	  Conference	  and	  2nd	  meeting	  of	  the	  ICA-­‐AP	  Committee	  on	  Cooperative	  Research	  in	  Bali,	  Indonesia,	  September	  16	  2014.	  The	  author	  thanks	  Louise	  Lamontagne	  and	  Akira	  Kurimoto,	  and	  conference	  participants	  for	  their	  valuable	  comments	  and	  suggestions.	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farms.	  Cooperatives	  also	  represent	  an	  alternative	  to	  famers	  as	  independent	  marketers	  of	  their	  products	  and	  purchasers	  of	  their	  inputs.	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  alternative	  provided	  by	  cooperatives,	  more	  generally,	  to	  traditional	  investor	  owned	  corporations.	  But	  what	  is	  unique	  to	  agriculture,	  especially	  in	  less	  developed	  economies,	  but	  also	  still	  somewhat	  the	  case	  in	  the	  more	  developed	  economies,	  is	  that	  small	  farms	  are	  of	  critical	  importance	  in	  agriculture	  and	  larger	  farm	  units	  often	  represent	  a	  competitive	  threat	  to	  relatively	  small	  independent	  family-­‐owned	  farms.	  Cooperatives	  represent	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  the	  independence	  of	  these	  farms,	  whilst	  provided	  the	  means	  for	  these	  farms	  to	  remain	  or	  become	  competitive	  through	  producing	  relatively	  efficiently	  in	  terms	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  productivity	  per	  unit	  of	  input	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  quality	  per	  unit	  of	  output.	  An	  alternative	  means	  of	  remaining	  competitive	  is	  for	  small	  famers	  to	  cut	  their	  real	  income	  to	  keep	  costs	  and	  thereby	  prices	  down	  to	  competitive	  levels.	  An	  important	  issue	  raised	  in	  this	  article	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  cooperatives	  are	  substitutes	  for	  traditional	  investor-­‐owned	  farms	  as	  a	  productive	  and	  competitive	  economic	  entity?	  Related	  to	  this,	  can	  cooperatives	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  larger	  investor-­‐owned	  farms?	  Can	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  replicate	  or	  better	  the	  assumed	  competitive	  attributes	  of	  the	  larger	  investor-­‐owned	  farms?	  Moreover,	  can	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  deliver	  on	  economic	  performance	  whilst	  generating	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  wellbeing	  to	  its	  members	  as	  compared	  to	  what’s	  typically	  on	  offer	  in	  the	  larger	  investor	  owned	  firm	  (farm)	  in	  terms	  income	  and	  working	  conditions	  to	  employees.	  This	  would	  be	  apart	  from	  higher	  levels	  of	  social	  wellbeing	  that	  some	  might	  derive	  from	  being	  member/owner	  of	  economically	  productive	  and	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sustainable	  cooperative.	  This	  paper	  presents	  a	  comparative	  modeling	  narrative	  on	  cooperative	  and	  privately	  held	  firms’	  organizational	  forms’	  potential	  impact	  on	  equitable	  and	  sustainable	  rural	  development.	  This	  speaks	  to	  issues	  of	  both	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  and	  how	  this	  income	  is	  distributed.	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  issues	  most	  pertinent	  to	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  but	  can	  be	  generalizable	  to	  the	  broader	  economic	  domain.	  It’s	  critical	  to	  develop	  a	  modeling	  framework	  wherein	  one	  can	  articulate	  and	  specify	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  different	  types	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  can	  be	  sustainable	  in	  the	  economic	  realm,	  whilst	  meeting	  the	  social-­‐economic	  objective	  of	  members—where	  a	  key	  goal	  is	  often	  maintaining	  the	  economic	  viability	  and	  thereby	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  smallholder	  farmstead.	  A	  crucial	  point	  made	  in	  article	  is	  that	  under	  reasonable	  assumptions	  and	  conditions	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  should	  be	  able	  to	  match	  the	  investor-­‐owned	  firm	  in	  the	  economic	  domain.	  It	  also	  provides	  individuals	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  remain	  independent	  players	  (owners	  and	  core	  decision-­‐makers)	  as	  part	  of	  a	  cooperative	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  forced	  into	  becoming	  employees,	  often	  with	  little	  bargaining-­‐power.	  Related	  to	  this,	  cooperatives	  also	  provide	  smallholders	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  their	  level	  of	  material	  wellbeing	  by	  increasing	  their	  productivity	  and	  increasing	  their	  share	  of	  income	  from	  what	  it	  would	  be	  under	  traditional	  organizational	  forms.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  cooperative	  farm,	  but	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  supply	  and	  value	  added	  cooperatives	  and	  agricultural	  mutuals	  or	  credit	  unions.	  These	  arguments	  build	  upon	  Altman	  (2001	  2002,	  2006,	  2014);	  Ben-­‐Nur	  Jones	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(1995);	  Bowles	  and	  Gintis	  (2011);	  Chayanov	  (1991);	  Gordon	  (1998);	  Leibenstein	  (1966);	  McCain (2008); Novkovic	  (2006,	  2007);	  Schultz	  (1964);	  
and Williamson (2009).	  To	  begin	  this	  theoretical	  narrative	  a	  relevant	  quote	  from	  IFAD	  (2011):	  	  	  Smallholder	  farmers	  gain	  big	  benefits	  from	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  including	  bargaining	  power	  and	  resource	  sharing	  that	  lead	  to	  food	  security	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  for	  millions,	  the	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO),	  the	  International	  Fund	  for	  Agricultural	  Development	  (IFAD)	  and	  the	  World	  Food	  Programme	  (WFP)	  stressed	  today	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  International	  Year	  of	  Cooperatives	  2012	  (IYC)	  in	  New	  York.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  in	  improving	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  smallholder	  farmers	  and	  their	  families	  cannot	  be	  overstated,	  the	  three	  Rome-­‐based	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  agencies	  said.	  Empowered	  by	  being	  a	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  group,	  smallholder	  farmers	  can	  negotiate	  better	  terms	  in	  contract	  farming	  and	  lower	  prices	  for	  agricultural	  inputs	  like	  seeds,	  fertilizer	  and	  equipment.	  In	  addition,	  cooperatives	  offer	  prospects	  that	  smallholder	  farmers	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  individually	  such	  as	  helping	  them	  to	  secure	  land	  rights	  and	  better	  market	  opportunities.	  	  
 This	  quote	  asserts	  many	  key	  points	  to	  modelled	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  world’s	  key	  development	  agencies,	  specifically	  related	  to	  agriculture,	  hypothesize	  the	  advantages	  of	  cooperatives	  for	  agricultural	  developed	  addressed	  in	  this	  paper.	  What	  is	  critical,	  however,	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  critical	  underpinning	  to	  such	  important	  hypotheses—under	  what	  conditions	  can	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  of	  various	  types	  be	  sustainable	  even	  in	  a	  competitive	  environment.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  the	  significance	  of	  cooperatives	  in	  agricultural	  sectors	  throughout	  the	  world	  in	  both	  developed	  and	  less	  developed	  economies	  (Altman	  2009a;	  ICA	  2014;	  United	  Nations	  2014).	  This	  speaks	  to	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  agriculture	  cooperative,	  which	  requires	  explanation	  in	  face	  of	  the	  negative	  modeling	  scenarios	  and	  predictions	  flowing	  from	  standard	  economic	  theory.	  Estimates	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  agriculture	  cooperatives	  aren’t	  unambiguously	  rigorous,	  but	  the	  available	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  they	  are	  of	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importance	  to	  various	  economies	  agricultural	  sectors.	  In	  many	  countries,	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  farmers	  are	  members	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  (ICA	  2014).	  
What	  is	  a	  Cooperative	  and	  Cooperative	  Governance	  	   Prior	  to	  a	  formal	  discussion	  of	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  it	  is	  important	  to	  briefly	  define	  what	  is	  a	  cooperative	  and	  what	  types	  of	  cooperatives	  tend	  to	  characterize	  the	  agricultural	  landscape.	  A	  cooperative	  organizational	  form	  has	  been	  defined,	  in	  its	  modern	  and	  operational	  form,	  flowing	  form	  the	  Rochdale	  Principles,	  articulated	  in	  1844	  by	  the	  Rochdale	  Society	  of	  Equitable	  Pioneers	  (a	  consumer	  cooperative)	  in	  Rochdale,	  England.	  This	  definition	  has	  been	  since	  modified	  by	  the	  International	  Cooperative	  Alliance,	  the	  international	  governing	  body	  of	  cooperatives.	  These	  definitions	  are	  important	  because	  they	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  organizational	  parameters	  within	  which	  cooperative	  decision-­‐making	  takes	  place	  and	  helps	  distinguish	  coopertives	  from	  the	  traditional	  investor-­‐owned	  firms.	  This	  helps	  better	  understand	  why	  cooperatives	  might	  be	  superior	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  outcomes	  to	  investor-­‐owned	  firms.	  	  The	  original	  principles	  states	  (Rochdale	  Pioneers	  Museum	  2014):	  	  
• That	  capital	  should	  be	  of	  their	  own	  providing	  and	  bear	  a	  fixed	  rate	  of	  interest.	  
• That	  only	  the	  purest	  provisions	  procurable	  should	  be	  supplied	  to	  members.	  
• That	  full	  weight	  and	  measure	  should	  be	  given.	  
• That	  market	  prices	  should	  be	  charged	  and	  no	  credit	  given	  nor	  asked.	  
• That	  profits	  should	  be	  divided	  pro	  rata	  upon	  the	  amount	  of	  purchases	  made	  by	  each	  member.	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• That	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘one	  member	  one	  vote’	  should	  obtain	  in	  government	  and	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  sexes	  in	  membership.	  
• That	  the	  management	  should	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  officers	  and	  committee	  elected	  periodically.	  
• That	  a	  definite	  percentage	  of	  profits	  should	  be	  allotted	  to	  education.	  
• That	  frequent	  statements	  and	  balance	  sheets	  should	  be	  presented	  to	  members.	  	   The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  cooperative	  should	  be	  dominated	  by	  democratic	  governance	  and	  this	  should	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  economic	  realm.	  Revisions	  have	  made	  to	  the	  principles,	  making	  the	  rules	  more	  flexible	  where	  the	  Rochdale	  rules	  were	  seen	  as	  potentially	  hindering	  economic	  performance.	  Even	  with	  the	  original	  principles,	  democratic	  governance	  is	  vested	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  structure,	  that	  actually	  and	  in	  effect	  reduces	  the	  transaction	  costs	  of	  governance—day-­‐to-­‐day	  decisions	  are	  not	  made	  by	  the	  collective,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  highly	  time-­‐consuming	  and	  potentially	  economically	  inefficient	  process.	  Still,	  too	  often,	  the	  Rochdale	  rules	  of	  governance	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  the	  exiting	  rules	  where	  critiquing	  cooperatives’	  governance	  structures	  as	  being	  incompatible	  both	  economic	  efficiency	  and	  economic	  effectiveness,	  especially	  when	  cooperatives	  are	  immersed	  in	  highly	  competitive	  environments.	  The	  Rochdale	  principles	  have	  evolved	  and	  modified,	  through	  the	  International	  Cooperative	  Alliance,	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  of	  what’s	  thought	  be	  required	  for	  the	  successful	  and	  sustainable	  operation	  of	  the	  cooperative.	  The	  current	  core	  principles	  of	  the	  cooperative	  organization	  form	  is	  more	  flexible	  than	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what’s	  specified	  in	  the	  in	  Rochdale	  principles	  and	  allows	  for	  cooperative	  operate	  in	  a	  low	  transaction	  costs	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  forming	  partnerships	  and	  raising	  capital	  external	  to	  the	  cooperative	  community,	  conditional	  upon	  democratic	  control	  over	  the	  cooperative	  by	  cooperative	  members.	  The	  following	  summarizes	  the	  key	  revised	  cooperative	  principles	  most	  relevant	  to	  governance	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  sustainability	  of	  cooperative	  organizational	  forms	  (ICA	  2008):	  
• Democratic control by members: One person, one vote, active membership 
participation, and elected officials responsible to membership. This incorporates a 
certain decree of hierarchical leadership since members need not and typically do 
not engage in day-to-day decision-making (reducing transaction costs). A key 
point here is that members have the last say on key decisions and are well 
informed of elected or appointed leadership decisions (transparency). 
• Democratic control of capital: Based on member contribution to cooperative’s 
capital (could be an equitable contribution). Part of capital is usually the common 
property of the cooperative. Surplus can be used for a variety of purposes as 
determined by cooperative members. Only part of the surplus is usually 
distributed to members. Surpluses can be used to build up reserves, to invest in 
the cooperative, and in the larger community. There is nothing stipulated in the 
rules pertinent to cooperative governance that surplus can’t be entirely invested to 
further develop or grow the cooperative. This would be similar to the investor 
owned corporation where the surplus can be invested or dispersed to shareholders 
as dividends or to management as bonuses. Except in the cooperative, surplus 
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allocation decisions must be made in a democratic and transparent manner. 
• Autonomy and Independence: To maintain cooperatives as autonomous self-help 
organizations ultimately controlled by members, the terms by which cooperatives 
enter into agreements with other organizations, inclusive or private or public 
organizations, or raise capital externally (as opposed from members or surpluses) 
must ensure continued democratic control by members. Thus, cooperatives can 
link-up with non-cooperative organizations and even raise capital external to the 
cooperative, thereby relaxing or even removing constraints that are often assumed 
to be married to the cooperative organizational form. 
• Education: Cooperative members, elected representative, managers and 
employees are supposed to be educated and trained so they contribute to the 
development of their cooperatives as cooperatives. 
Different	  Types	  of	  Cooperatives	  Cooperatives	  can	  take	  many	  forms.	  Most	  pertinent	  to	  this	  paper	  relates	  to	  cooperatives	  which	  represent	  a	  formal	  linkage	  or	  confederation	  of	  smaller	  farms.	  This	  allows	  farm	  families	  to	  maintain	  ownership	  over	  their	  farm,	  whilst	  cooperating	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  inputs	  (equipment	  and	  seed,	  for	  example);	  marketing,	  sales,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  output;	  labor	  pooling;	  value	  added	  production	  (processing	  of	  outputs	  along	  the	  supply	  chain),	  and	  credit	  (credit	  unions	  and	  mutuals).	  These	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  can	  generate	  economies	  in	  these	  domains	  without	  farmers	  losing	  control	  over	  their	  farm.	  Each	  farm	  becomes	  an	  equal	  partner	  in	  the	  cooperative.	  This	  can	  actually	  allow	  smaller	  farms	  to	  remain	  competitive	  and	  sustainable.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  cooperation.	  	  This	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represents	  a	  type	  of	  polycentric	  governance	  structure	  (Ostrom	  et	  al,	  1961,	  pp.	  831–832),	  which	  is	  a	  decentralized	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  linking	  various	  nodes	  of	  local	  control	  (such	  as	  the	  individual	  small	  farm)	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  shared	  governance	  (the	  collective).	  Moreover,	  being	  part	  of	  a	  cooperative	  might	  help	  increase	  the	  overall	  size	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  from	  what	  is	  would	  be	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  cooperation	  and	  under,	  certain	  conditions,	  even	  more	  so	  than	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  much	  larger	  corporate	  farms	  (investor	  owned	  farms).	  In	  addition,	  given	  that	  small	  farm	  holders	  are	  analogous	  to	  the	  self-­‐employed	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  capture	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  than	  they	  would	  if	  they	  were	  simply	  employees	  on	  the	  larger	  farm	  or	  related	  corporations.	  Cooperative	  members	  have	  a	  determining	  say	  on	  how	  much	  they	  get	  compensated	  for	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  cooperative.	  Capturing	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  would	  also	  be	  facilitated	  when	  farmers	  are	  members	  of	  credit	  unions,	  supplier	  cooperative,	  and	  value	  added	  production	  cooperative.	  Members	  can	  accrue	  more	  economic	  benefits	  or	  revert	  these	  to	  their	  cooperative	  for	  investment	  purposes.	  Cooperatives	  can	  also	  include	  common	  ownership	  of	  the	  farm—the	  more	  extreme	  form	  of	  an	  agricultural	  cooperative.	  In	  such	  cooperatives,	  economic	  operations	  could	  encompass	  agricultural	  production,	  manufacturing,	  and	  distribution.	  And	  such	  cooperatives	  can	  form	  larger	  cooperatives	  linking	  one	  to	  the	  other	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  supply,	  distribution,	  and	  credit,	  for	  example,	  to	  capture	  economies	  of	  scale.	  The	  latter	  cooperative	  organizational	  form	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  ‘classic’	  Kibbutz	  of	  Israel.	  But	  this	  vehicle	  for	  a	  cooperative	  economy	  completely	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integrates	  the	  individual	  into	  the	  collective	  or	  cooperative.	  For	  example,	  independent	  small	  famers	  would	  have	  to	  integrate	  themselves	  into	  this	  type	  of	  collective,	  giving	  up	  their	  farmstead	  and	  their	  economic	  independence.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  cooperatives	  based	  on	  linking	  independent	  farmers	  (who	  remain	  independent)	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  domains	  as	  discussed	  above.	  But	  this	  more	  integrated	  cooperative	  provides	  options	  to	  farm	  workers	  to	  become	  equal	  partners	  in	  a	  cooperative,	  which	  would	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  agricultural	  cooperative	  formed	  by	  linking	  currently	  existing	  small	  farms.	  If	  you’re	  a	  farm	  laborer,	  you	  have	  no	  farm	  that	  could	  form	  part	  of	  a	  cooperative.	  The	  fact	  that	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  can	  take	  on	  different	  organizational	  forms,	  provides	  farmers	  as	  well	  as	  farm	  workers	  with	  alternatives	  within	  the	  cooperative	  structure	  to	  achieve	  economic	  sustenance	  and	  independence.	  
The	  Demand	  and	  Demand	  for	  Agricultural	  Cooperatives	  One	  question	  to	  be	  modeled	  is	  whether	  cooperatives	  are	  at	  least	  as	  efficient	  as	  investor-­‐owned	  firm	  (IOF)	  in	  agriculture.	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  more	  flexible	  cooperative	  wherein	  independent	  famers	  retain	  their	  economic	  independence.	  When	  at	  least	  equally	  efficient	  to	  the	  larger	  IOF,	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  would	  be	  ‘economic’	  substitutes	  to	  investor-­‐owned	  agricultural	  economic	  entities.	  This	  would	  be	  independent	  of	  any	  distributional	  impact	  that	  cooperative	  might	  have	  on	  the	  coop	  members	  and	  the	  overall	  economy.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  demand	  for	  cooperatives	  could	  then	  be	  modeled	  as	  the	  differential	  demand	  for	  alternative	  organizational	  forms	  where	  the	  coop	  is	  in	  no	  way	  inferior	  (in	  terms	  of	  efficiency)	  to	  the	  IOF.	  One	  would	  then	  have	  to	  determine	  why	  farmers	  would	  not	  join	  a	  cooperative,	  especially	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if	  in	  so	  doing	  economic	  benefits	  are	  generated,	  such	  as	  increased	  efficiency	  and	  increased	  real	  income.	  	  This	  issue	  can	  be	  addressed	  using	  a	  basic	  demand	  and	  supply	  analytical	  framework.	  This	  is	  given	  in	  Figure	  1.	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  demand	  curve	  for	  cooperative	  (given	  by	  coop	  services)	  is	  downward	  sloping—price	  goes	  done,	  demand	  goes	  up.	  We	  assume,	  for	  simplicity,	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  cooperatives	  or	  coop	  services	  is	  given	  by	  a	  horizontal	  supply	  curve.	  In	  this	  model,	  given	  the	  demand	  curve,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  equilibrium	  supply	  of	  cooperative	  would	  be	  marginal	  when	  supply	  is	  relatively	  high,	  such	  as	  given	  by	  D0	  and	  S0	  in	  Figure	  1.	  But	  the	  equilibrium	  supply	  would	  by	  relative	  high	  if	  the	  supply	  curve	  shifts	  down	  to	  S1,	  for	  example.	  These	  shifts	  could	  be	  a	  product	  of	  changes	  in	  institutional	  costs	  of	  establishing	  a	  cooperative.	  	  Therefore,	  if	  these	  costs	  are	  sufficiently	  high,	  they	  can	  squeeze	  out	  the	  cooperative	  alternative	  from	  famers	  options.	  This	  squeezing	  out	  is	  both	  economically	  and	  socially	  problematic	  if	  the	  institutional	  parameters	  provide	  farmers	  or	  farm	  workers	  with	  artificially	  high	  cost	  cooperatives	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  IOFs.	  This	  simply	  suggests	  that	  lowering	  these	  ‘supply	  side’	  costs—creating	  at	  a	  minimum	  level	  playing	  field	  with	  IOFs	  can	  provide	  broader	  options	  to	  farmers	  and	  farm	  laborers.	  But	  in	  this	  scenario,	  when	  the	  cooperative	  alternative	  is	  not	  available,	  labor	  might	  be	  forced	  into	  IOFs,	  which	  can	  have	  serious	  negative	  implications	  in	  terms	  poverty,	  distribution,	  and	  even	  investment.	  Both	  the	  demand	  and	  the	  supply	  side	  are	  important	  to	  determining	  the	  equilibrium	  number	  of	  cooperatives,	  controlling	  for	  the	  size	  of	  cooperatives.	  For	  example,	  if	  on	  the	  demand	  side,	  changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  parameters	  have	  little	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effect	  along	  demand	  curve,	  D2,	  the	  equilibrium	  level	  of	  cooperatives	  will	  remain	  relatively	  low.	  So	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  cooperative	  to	  price	  can	  be	  important.	  However,	  this	  being	  said,	  other	  demand-­‐side	  factors	  are	  also	  of	  critical	  importance	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  cooperatives.	  	  Even	  where	  demand	  is	  insensitive	  (or	  inelastic)	  to	  price,	  shifting	  the	  demand	  curve	  outward	  can	  play	  a	  determining	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  cooperatives.	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  model,	  the	  knowledge	  that	  potential	  cooperators	  have	  about	  the	  efficiency,	  competitiveness,	  sustainability,	  and	  wellbeing	  (including	  family	  income)	  effects	  of	  cooperatives,	  as	  a	  demand-­‐side	  shift	  factor.	  If	  one	  believes	  that	  cooperatives	  are	  not	  sustainable	  or	  simply	  sustainable	  through	  farm	  families	  reducing	  their	  income	  to	  low	  levels,	  this	  would	  shift	  the	  demand	  curve	  inward,	  whilst	  a	  more	  positive	  set	  of	  beliefs	  would	  shift	  the	  demand	  curve	  outward.	  A	  negative	  set	  of	  beliefs	  about	  cooperatives	  can	  be	  based	  on	  false	  or	  misleading	  information,	  as	  can	  positive	  beliefs.	  But	  if	  the	  negative	  beliefs	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  cooperative	  alternative,	  then	  the	  demand	  curve	  is	  situated	  further	  to	  the	  left	  than	  it	  would	  be	  if	  more	  accurate	  and	  plausible	  information	  were	  available.	  Therefore,	  the	  equilibrium	  level	  of	  cooperatives	  is	  also	  a	  function	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  potential	  cooperators	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  fundamentals	  underlying	  cooperatives.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  cooperatives	  are	  at	  least	  as	  economically	  viable	  as	  their	  IOF	  alternative,	  improving	  the	  information	  on	  cooperatives	  to	  potential	  cooperators	  will	  shift	  the	  demand	  for	  cooperatives	  to	  the	  right.	  Such	  information	  can	  also	  serve	  to	  breakdown	  traditional	  normative	  resistance	  and	  antipathy	  against	  the	  cooperative	  organization	  form.	  A	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key	  point	  here	  is	  that	  ‘false’	  mental	  models	  about	  cooperatives	  can	  reduce	  the	  equilibrium	  amount	  of	  cooperative,	  irrespective	  of	  ‘supply-­‐side’	  conditions.	  Another	  demand-­‐side	  shift	  factor	  would	  be	  increasing	  the	  productivity	  of	  cooperatives.	  The	  more	  productive	  the	  cooperative,	  the	  further	  to	  the	  right	  should	  be	  the	  demand	  curve.	  Higher	  productivity	  of	  the	  farm	  can	  be	  achieved,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  simply	  by	  establishing	  a	  cooperative.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  both	  the	  scale	  effect	  and	  the	  x-­‐efficiency	  effect,	  discussed	  below.	  Further	  increases	  in	  productivity	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  increasing	  the	  linkages	  between	  farm	  cooperatives	  and	  other	  cooperatives	  related	  to	  agriculture	  such	  as	  supply	  cooperative	  and	  credit	  unions.	  One	  might	  end	  up	  with	  a	  demand	  curve	  such	  as	  D1.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  equilibrium	  amount	  of	  cooperative	  should	  be	  Q3	  given	  supply	  curve	  S1.	  The	  demand	  curve	  could	  also	  be	  shifted	  based	  on	  the	  personal	  preferences	  of	  individuals	  involved	  in	  agriculture.	  Even	  given	  full	  knowledge	  about	  the	  efficiency	  of	  cooperatives	  (let’s	  say	  high	  levels	  of	  efficiency),	  some	  individuals	  might	  simply	  prefer	  to	  remain	  independent	  economic	  agents,	  shifting	  the	  demand	  curve	  to	  the	  left.	  	  A	  critical	  point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  even	  if	  based	  on	  objective	  conditions	  or	  fundamentals,	  the	  demand	  curve	  should	  be	  at	  D1	  (this	  would	  incorporate	  the	  personal	  preferences	  of	  potential	  cooperators),	  the	  actual	  demand	  curve	  might	  only	  be	  at	  D0	  or	  D*,	  if	  individuals	  do	  not	  have	  accurate	  information	  about	  cooperatives	  and	  if	  the	  information	  they	  have	  is	  not	  easily	  and	  well	  understood.	  An	  individual’s	  demand	  for	  a	  cooperative	  may	  not	  reflect	  their	  true	  preferences,	  or	  the	  preferences	  they	  would	  have	  if	  they	  better	  and	  more	  easily	  understood	  information	  on	  cooperatives	  and	  this	  information	  was	  easily	  available—that	  is,	  at	  low	  cost	  and	  low	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risk.	  	  
The	  Relative	  Superiority	  of	  Agricultural	  Cooperatives	  
(i)	  Economies	  of	  Scale	  and	  Scope	  and	  Transaction	  Costs	  Cooperatives	  can	  potentially	  generate	  higher	  rates	  of	  growth	  and	  more	  equitable	  growth,	  even	  in	  competitive	  economic	  environments.	  Economies	  can	  be	  captured	  through	  producer,	  purchasing	  and	  marketing	  coops	  as	  well	  as	  through	  pooled	  labor	  amongst	  cooperatives.	  Economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope,	  that	  larger	  IOFs	  naturally	  benefit	  from,	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  small	  farm	  units,	  through	  cooperation.	  This	  would	  make	  the	  smaller	  farm	  units	  linked	  through	  cooperatives,	  more	  cost	  competitive	  than	  the	  de-­‐linked	  small	  farm	  units	  that	  act	  as	  independent	  economic	  agents	  (for	  a	  similar	  argument	  see,	  Valentinov	  2007).	  Cooperative	  linking	  also	  allows	  the	  smaller	  farm	  units	  to	  be	  competitive	  with	  the	  larger	  farm	  units	  by	  being	  relatively	  productive.	  In	  addition,	  as	  discussed	  below,	  cooperatives	  facilitate	  higher	  levels	  of	  x-­‐efficiency,	  given	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  cooperative	  governance.	  This	  provides	  cooperatives,	  potentially,	  with	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  over,	  IOF,	  this	  is	  a	  part	  and	  distinct	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  achieving	  these	  various	  economies	  requires	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  cooperative	  alternative	  and	  the	  capability	  of	  joining/forming	  a	  cooperative.	  The	  traditional	  economies	  of	  scale	  refer	  to	  reducing	  average	  cost	  by	  increasing	  the	  scale	  of	  output,	  more	  bananas,	  cocoa,	  sugar	  or	  wheat.	  Economies	  of	  scope	  refer	  to	  reductions	  in	  average	  cost	  that	  are	  a	  product	  of	  producing	  more	  than	  one	  product.	  Scale	  and	  scope	  can	  be	  facilitated	  through	  larger	  units	  of	  production,	  often	  identified	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  with	  the	  larger	  farm	  entity	  or	  with	  larger	  input	  suppliers	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and	  distributors.	  	  Oliver	  Williamson	  (1981,	  1985,	  2010),	  building	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Roland	  Coase	  (1937),	  developed	  models	  to	  explain	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  firm	  independent	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  reasons.	  His	  explanations	  were	  largely	  related	  to	  reducing	  the	  overall	  transaction	  costs	  of	  doing	  business,	  hence	  reducing	  average	  production	  costs.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  transaction	  costs	  refer	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  drawing-­‐up,	  signing,	  monitoring,	  and	  enforcing	  of	  contracts.	  Contracts,	  the	  specification	  of	  relationships	  between	  economic	  agents	  or	  entities,	  such	  as	  firms,	  are	  key	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  any	  economy	  and	  they	  can	  also	  be	  of	  an	  informal	  type.	  Williamson	  attempts	  to	  explain	  why	  increasing	  plant	  size	  and	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  firm	  size	  (multi-­‐plant	  firms),	  is	  rational	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  increasing	  economic	  efficiency.	  	  
In terms of transaction costs analyses, Williamson focuses on (1981, 1985) 
bounded rationality (BR), opportunism with guile (OG), and asset specificity (AS).  For 
Williamson, BR refers costs incurred in the collection and processing of information.  
OG refers to the tendency of many individuals to deceive and cheat others in market 
transaction—an important aspect of the human condition, according to Williamson.  AS 
refers to assets that once set in place, they cannot be redeployed except at a significant 
cost to its owners or users. It is realistically assumed that assets are not like ‘putty’ that 
can be costlessly shifted from one use to another. Opportunism with guile, the proclivity 
of economic agents to behave dishonestly, is critical to Williamson’s analysis. In a world 
where honesty and goodwill prevail transaction costs would be negligible. In such a 
world one can trust individuals to provide good quality and accurate information. 
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Therefore, data collection and processing costs would be negligible. Moreover, asset 
specificity would be not be a relevant cost consideration when one’s information 
reasonably accurate since you’re initial allocation of assets would stand a very high 
probability of being correct. Williamson argues that growing the size of the firm, 
establishing or buying out similar types of firms (horizontal integration) and establishing 
or buying out suppliers and distributors, is a substitute for creating honesty across 
economic agents. Williamson assumes that opportunism with guile should not be 
prevalent inside the larger corporation as the goals and objectives and decision-making 
are more in synch and behavior is less costly to monitor. The	  traditional	  view	  in	  economics	  is	  that	  small	  is	  better	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  many	  small	  firms	  generate	  more	  competitiveness	  and	  therefore	  more	  ‘efficient’	  economic	  results.	  Although	  economies	  of	  scale	  are	  part	  of	  the	  traditional	  economic	  toolbox,	  very	  large	  firms	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  necessary	  to	  generate	  optimal	  scale	  efficiencies,	  hence	  the	  pursuit	  of	  scale	  economies	  should	  not	  affect	  the	  extent	  of	  competitiveness.	  Still,	  arguments	  persist	  on	  the	  advantages	  of	  getting	  bigger	  and	  bigger,	  in	  terms	  of	  average	  cost,	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  economics	  of	  scale.	  Transaction	  cost-­‐type	  analysis	  goes	  beyond	  any	  traditional	  scale	  and	  scope	  analysis,	  maintaining	  that	  corporate	  bigness	  reduces	  transaction	  costs	  significantly.	  But	  both	  analytical	  frameworks	  pay	  no	  heed	  to	  cooperatives	  as	  an	  alternative	  organizational	  structure	  within	  which	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  and	  just	  as	  importantly	  transaction	  cost	  economies	  can	  be	  achieved.	  Moreover,	  given	  Williamson	  focus	  on	  opportunism	  with	  guile,	  cooperatives	  governance	  structure,	  at	  least	  as	  specified	  by	  the	  International	  Cooperative	  Alliance	  and	  discussed	  above,	  provides	  an	  incentive	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environment	  to	  reduce	  such	  selfish	  and	  self-­‐serving	  behavior.	  This	  is	  another	  good	  reason	  to	  model	  the	  cooperative	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  IOF	  in	  agriculture.	  Cooperatives	  based	  on	  the	  linking	  of	  independent	  small	  farms,	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  sharing	  of	  inputs	  such	  as	  equipment	  and	  seed,	  labor	  pooling,	  sharing	  land	  when	  necessary	  (larger	  more	  efficient	  plots	  of	  land),	  storage,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  output,	  are	  all	  plausible	  economic	  entities.	  	  Diagram	  2,	  illustrates	  the	  impact	  of	  cooperation	  as	  well	  as	  corporate	  bigness	  on	  the	  productivity	  and	  hence	  average	  cost	  of	  smaller	  farms.	  In	  the	  traditional	  model,	  simply	  increasing	  firm	  size	  shifts	  the	  firm’s	  average	  cost	  curve	  downward	  to	  the	  right	  from	  ACs	  to	  ACL1.	  But	  through	  cooperation,	  the	  average	  cost	  curve	  also	  shifts	  downward	  and	  to	  the	  right	  in	  the	  same	  fashion,	  as	  the	  cooperative	  becomes	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  economies	  in	  scale	  and	  scope	  as	  well	  as	  in	  transaction	  costs	  can	  be	  captured.	  Moreover,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  recommended	  governance	  structure	  of	  cooperative	  might	  be	  able	  to	  better	  handle	  transaction	  costs,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  opportunism	  with	  guile,	  cooperatives	  might	  serve	  to	  shift	  the	  average	  cost	  curve	  to	  ACL2,	  potentially	  making	  the	  cooperative	  even	  more	  cost	  competitive	  than	  the	  IOF.	  This	  critically	  depends	  on	  the	  actual	  governance	  structure	  that	  the	  cooperative	  adopts	  and	  implements.	  This	  modeling	  matches	  and	  helps	  explain	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  even	  when	  competing	  with	  relative	  larger	  IOFs.	  Achieving	  economies	  in	  scale	  and	  scope	  and	  transaction	  costs	  does	  not	  necessarily	  require	  large	  and	  highly	  integrated	  agricultural	  corporations.	  Cooperation	  through	  linkages	  across	  farms	  and	  farmers’	  ownership	  of	  supply	  and	  distribution	  cooperatives	  is	  a	  viable	  alternative.	  Theoretically,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  predict	  that	  cooperatives	  should	  fare	  worse	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than	  IOF	  in	  terms	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope.	  The	  same	  should	  be	  true	  of	  economies	  related	  to	  transaction	  costs.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  small	  farms	  can	  compete	  with	  the	  larger	  farms	  without	  becoming	  part	  of	  a	  cooperative,	  at	  least	  up	  to	  a	  point.	  Farmers	  can	  cut	  their	  own	  income	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  their	  family	  members	  working	  on	  the	  form	  to	  keep	  compete	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  cheep	  labor	  as	  opposed	  to	  higher	  productivity,	  which	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  joining	  or	  forming	  a	  cooperative.	  Famers	  can	  engage	  in	  ‘self-­‐exploitation’,	  paying	  themselves	  below	  the	  market	  wage	  to	  maintain	  their	  independence.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  a	  shift	  downward	  in	  the	  small	  farm’s	  average	  costs	  curve	  from	  ACs	  to	  ACs*.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  cutting	  income	  to	  workers	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  reductions	  in	  effort	  inputs	  and	  therefore	  productivity—the	  efficiency	  wage	  effect.	  Workers	  retaliate	  against	  employers	  from	  being	  treated	  unfairly.	  But	  this	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  of	  self-­‐exploitation	  where	  cuts	  to	  income	  are	  self-­‐imposed	  to	  maintain	  ones	  competitive	  position.	  Small	  farmers	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  quite	  flexible	  in	  efforts	  to	  survive	  on	  the	  market.	  But	  the	  self-­‐exploitation	  option	  is	  not	  long	  term	  optimal	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  productivity	  or	  wellbeing.	  But	  this	  can	  be	  the	  only	  plausible	  option	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  viable	  cooperative	  alternative.	  A	  viable	  cooperative	  alternative	  can	  be	  marginalized	  by	  supply	  and	  demand	  side	  considerations,	  discussed	  above.	  This	  is	  inclusive	  of	  institutional	  impediments	  to	  cooperative	  development	  and	  misperceptions	  about	  the	  cooperative	  alternative	  amongst	  potential	  cooperators.	  
(ii)	  X-­‐efficiency	  An	  important	  theoretical	  concept	  that	  helps	  to	  better	  explain	  and	  frame	  the	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potential	  cooperative	  advantage	  of	  farmer	  ownership	  through	  cooperatives	  as	  opposed	  to	  corporate	  employment	  or	  large	  IOF	  (large	  farms)	  is	  x-­‐efficiency	  theory.	  X-­‐efficiency	  theory,	  first	  articulated	  by	  Harvey	  Leibenstein	  (1966),	  assumes,	  based	  on	  the	  evidence	  that	  effort	  inputs	  in	  both	  its	  quantity	  and	  quality	  dimensions	  is	  a	  variable	  in	  the	  production	  function.	  Unlike	  conventional	  theory,	  the	  assumption	  is	  not	  made,	  a	  priori,	  that	  firms	  will	  be	  economically	  efficient	  independent	  of	  market	  structure	  and	  that	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  principle-­‐agent	  problems	  are	  quickly	  resolved.	  These	  assumptions	  generate	  the	  traditional	  theory’s	  assumption	  that	  effort	  inputs	  are	  fixed	  at	  some	  level,	  which	  is	  often	  assumed	  be	  at	  some	  maximum.	  But	  the	  assumption	  of	  effort	  variability	  allows	  one	  to	  better	  model	  differential	  productivity	  across	  organizational	  forms.	  Given	  effort	  variability,	  it	  possible	  for	  firms	  to	  produce	  less	  than	  they	  can	  potentially,	  given	  their	  traditional	  inputs	  (such	  as	  capital,	  labor,	  and	  land)	  and	  technology.	  When	  firms	  produce	  below	  their	  potential,	  because	  of	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  effort	  input,	  this	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  x-­‐inefficiency	  in	  production.	  Ceteris	  paribus,	  the	  lower	  the	  level	  of	  effort	  input,	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  x-­‐inefficiency	  and	  the	  lower	  the	  level	  of	  x-­‐efficiency.	  The	  level	  of	  x-­‐efficiency	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  incentive	  environment	  facing	  the	  firm.	  One	  argument	  (Leibenstein	  1966)	  is	  that	  in	  a	  less	  competitive	  environment	  firm	  management	  and	  owners	  prefer	  to	  invest	  less	  effort	  in	  managing	  the	  firm,	  reducing	  firm	  productivity	  and	  thereby	  increasing	  average	  production	  costs.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  managerial	  slack.	  Such	  behavior	  is	  rational	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  management	  and	  owners	  given	  that	  such	  behavior	  serves	  to	  maximize	  or	  at	  improve	  their	  level	  of	  wellbeing	  or	  utility.	  The	  higher	  average	  costs	  are	  sustainable	  as	  long	  as	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the	  x-­‐inefficient	  firms	  are	  not	  in	  an	  optimal	  competitive	  environment	  or	  are	  otherwise	  protected	  from	  competitive	  pressures.	  Average	  cost	  can	  be	  given	  by	  the 
following equation, assuming	  a very simple economy where labor is the only costed input 
(Altman 2001).	  
1.    , 
where AC is average cost, w is the wage rate or, more generally, the unit cost of inputs, 
(Q/L) is the average product of labor, Q is total output, and L is labor input measured in 
terms of hours worked. Anything that reduces productivity, such as managerial cost will, 
ceteris paribus, increase average cost. 
A broader x-efficiency theoretical framework opens the door a wide array of 
incentive as being important to movements in effort inputs (Altman 2001, 2002, 2006, 
2009b; see also Gordon 1998; McCain 2008). This includes the incentive environment 
facing employees, which incorporates, wage and working conditions, affinity with and 
trust in the firm, substantive input in the decision-making process and the day-to-day 
operation of the firm, and evolved behavioral norms with respect to the firm. These 
variables can also affect managerial decision-making. Overall, these various incentives, if 
poorly designed and implemented will reduce effort inputs and, therefore, reduce labor 
productivity and possibly increase average cost. On the other hand, a well-designed 
incentive environment within the firm will increase effort inputs and, therefore, 
productivity and possibly decrease average cost. Moreover, these incentive variables 
affect effort inputs independent of the competitive environment. Therefore, even with 











production with a properly designed and implemented incentive environment. Perfect 
competition pressures firms into becoming more x-efficient as one decision-making 
option. Imperfect competition protects x-inefficient firms. 
This modeling framework can be applied to cooperatives in general and to 
agricultural sector cooperatives more specifically, especially given that many of the 
variable that, together, impact on productivity are part and parcel of the cooperative 
organization form. In the managerial slack model, it is assumed that there are no change 
to managerial or owner compensation as effort variability changes. It is also assumed that 
managerial slack (not working in the best interest of the firm), is the best behavioral 
assumption that can be made with regards management/owners. However, with regards to 
cooperatives this should not be the case. One would expect management’s interest would 
be aligned with that the cooperative (of which management would usually be a member 
of) and that effective application of cooperative principles would increase the probability 
that this would be the case. But such an alignment of interests need not take place if 
institutional failure occurs—when theb institutional environment is not conducive to 
minimizing managerial slack but also opportunism with guile. An appropriate incentive 
environment can increase the level of x-efficiency in this domain, often without 
increasing the cost of engaging quality management. 
With regards to the larger incentive environment, here too the cooperative 
organizational form can provide an x-efficiency environment that is superior to what is 
provided by the IOF. But in this domain, improving the incentive environment comes at 
some cost, especially with regards to improvements in wages and working conditions. 
Such improvements contribute to a sense of fairness and trust across economic agents 
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within the firm. Therefore, an improved incentive environment here positively affect both 
‘w’ and (Q/L) or productivity. And, a poorer incentive environment would typically have 
a negative effect on both of these variables. In this type of model, increasing the level of 
x-efficiency need not reduce average cost and reducing the level of x-efficiency need not 
increase average cost. The cooperative organizational form represents one type of 
improved institutional environment. And one common critique of cooperatives in general 
is that they are more costly and must therefore be less competitive than the IOF. 
Therefore, being fairer and more democratic is too costly to be sustainable in a 
competitive market economy. Increasing ‘w’ increases average cost because it is assumed 
that effort is fixed and that there can be no offsetting x-efficiency effect on productivity. 
But this should not be the case in a cooperative. 
In the cooperative, average cost need not increase if the cooperative generates 
sufficient cost offsets in terms of (Q/L). And, if w falls in the traditional model, this 
reduces unit costs. But this would not be the case if lower wages induce sufficiently 
lower productivity, as workers retaliate for being treated unfairly. It is quite possible that 
both cooperative and fairer firms, more generally speaking, need not be either more or 
less competitive when effort inputs are allowed to vary with changes in the incentive 
environment. Changes in ‘w’ can always be offset by changes in productivity. More 
specifically, cooperatives need not be less competitive than IOF. But the competitive of 
the cooperative is predicated on its ability to become relative x-efficient. In	  the	  traditional	  economic	  model	  if	  two	  firms	  are	  equally	  competitive,	  one	  can	  infer	  they	  are	  both	  equally	  efficient.	  Two	  firms	  with	  same	  quantum	  of	  traditional	  inputs	  should	  produce	  the	  same	  level	  of	  output.	  But	  in	  the	  more	  generalized	  x-­‐
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efficiency	  model	  the	  cooperative	  should	  generate	  a	  larger	  economic	  pie	  even	  whilst	  it	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  same	  average	  cost	  as	  the	  IOF.	  	  Overall,	  cooperative	  organizational	  forms	  can	  incentivize	  increases	  in	  economic	  or	  x-­‐efficiencies,	  which	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  process	  of	  rural	  economic	  development	  by	  increasing	  pie	  size	  by	  directly	  increasing,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  the	  material	  wellbeing	  of	  workers.	  Moreover,	  contrary	  to	  the	  traditional	  economic	  model	  higher	  cost	  cooperatives	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘w’	  need	  not	  be	  driven	  out	  of	  the	  market	  by	  the	  lower	  cost	  IOFs.	  Some	  these	  points	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.	  In	  the	  traditional	  model,	  any	  increase	  to	  ‘w’,	  which	  is	  labeled	  for	  our	  purposes,	  “Costs	  of	  Being	  Cooperative,”	  invariably	  increases	  average	  costs	  and	  is	  given	  by	  average	  cost	  curve	  CM,	  which	  relates	  average	  costs	  to	  changes	  in	  ‘w’.	  But	  for	  the	  cooperative	  firm,	  the	  increasing	  costs	  of	  making	  a	  firm	  more	  cooperative	  need	  not	  increase	  average	  given	  the	  appropriate	  cost	  offsets,	  through	  increases	  in	  productivity.	  So,	  productivity	  increases	  as	  immediate	  costs	  ‘w’	  increase.	  This	  is	  given	  by	  d.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  possible	  that	  average	  cost	  will	  not	  change	  in	  the	  faces	  of	  increases	  in	  immediate	  costs,	  which	  is	  given	  by	  c,	  which	  is	  horizontal	  up	  to	  BM	  or	  b.	  As	  immediate	  costs	  increase	  beyond	  b,	  average	  cost	  increases	  as	  the	  cooperative	  can’t	  increase	  effort	  sufficiently	  to	  generate	  the	  necessary	  productivity	  cost	  offsets	  to	  keep	  average	  cost	  from	  rising.	  Effort	  increases	  hit	  the	  fall	  of	  diminishing	  returns.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  cooperativeness	  that	  is	  sustainable	  given	  effort	  variability	  and	  an	  appropriate	  incentive	  environment.	  The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin	  is	  that	  non-­‐cooperative	  firms,	  dominated	  by	  the	  IOF	  organizational	  form,	  need	  not	  dominate	  cooperative	  firms	  in	  terms	  of	  competitiveness.	  Moreover,	  to	  the	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extent	  that	  technological	  change	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  higher	  immediate	  costs	  of	  becoming	  more	  cooperative,	  this	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  shifting	  the	  cooperative	  firm’s	  average	  cost	  curve	  to	  BMT	  (Altman	  2009b).	  This	  provides	  cooperatives	  with	  an	  additional	  decree	  of	  freedom	  in	  dealing	  dynamically,	  over	  time,	  with	  immediate	  cost	  pressures	  in	  a	  planned	  and	  systematic	  manner.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  important	  discuss	  the	  point	  that	  cooperatives	  are	  more	  flexible	  organizations	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  dealing	  with	  economic	  shocks	  than	  is	  the	  traditional	  IOF.	  As	  already	  discussed	  independent	  small	  farmers	  can	  drive	  their	  income	  down	  to	  quite	  low	  to	  maintain	  their	  competitive	  position	  against	  larger	  farmers.	  Of	  course,	  farmers	  don’t	  respond	  to	  their	  self-­‐exploitation	  by	  retaliating	  against	  themselves	  by	  reducing	  their	  efforts	  inputs	  and	  thereby	  their	  productivity.	  This	  same	  narrative	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  cooperatives	  where	  farmers	  are	  in	  effect	  owner-­‐operators	  who	  are	  cooperators.	  This	  argument	  can	  modelled	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  efficiency	  wage	  literature,	  where	  it	  assumed	  in	  its	  most	  contemporaneous	  version,	  that	  effort	  is	  a	  positive	  function	  of	  wages	  up	  to	  some	  maximum	  wherein	  average	  costs	  are	  minimized	  and	  rates	  of	  profits	  are	  maximized.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  efficiency	  wage.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  wage	  are	  sticky	  downward	  at	  this	  wage	  since	  cutting	  the	  wage,	  for	  example	  during	  an	  economic	  recession	  or	  company	  crises,	  will	  result	  in	  workers	  retaliating	  against	  being	  treated	  unfairly	  by	  reducing	  their	  effort	  inputs	  thereby	  increasing	  average	  cost.	  Related	  to	  this,	  workers	  will	  lose	  trust	  in	  their	  employers	  causing	  workers	  to	  locate	  other	  jobs	  when	  and	  where	  possible,	  increasing	  job	  turnover	  and	  further	  increasing	  average	  cost	  (Akerlof	  1982;	  Akerlof	  and	  Yellen	  1990;	  Bewley	  1999).	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In	  Figure	  4	  these	  points	  are	  illustrated	  by	  efficiency	  wage	  curve	  EW,	  which	  is	  subject	  to	  diminishing	  returns	  with	  regards	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  wage	  rate.	  The	  efficiency	  wage	  is	  given	  by	  w*.	  The	  important	  point	  to	  be	  made	  here	  is	  that	  in	  cooperatives	  if	  the	  wage	  and	  other	  benefits	  need	  to	  be	  reduced,	  it	  unlikely	  that	  cooperators	  will	  cut	  effort	  inputs	  in	  response,	  hence	  if	  wages	  are	  reduced	  below	  w*,	  one	  can	  assume	  a	  perfectly	  elastic	  productivity	  curve	  at	  point	  a.	  Any	  reduction	  in	  wages	  would	  not	  effect	  the	  cooperatives	  productivity.	  Cooperatives	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  efficiency	  wage	  effect	  whereby	  workers	  reduce	  effort	  input	  when	  wage	  and/or	  working	  conditions	  deteriorate.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  face	  of	  economic	  shocks,	  workers	  (coop	  members)	  can	  reduce	  their	  own	  economic	  compensation	  without	  retaliated	  (against	  themselves)	  for	  cutting	  such	  compensation.	  For	  this	  reason,	  cooperatives	  are	  more	  flexible	  than	  IOFs	  in	  face	  of	  price	  shocks,	  for	  example,	  which	  are	  very	  common	  in	  agriculture.	  They	  can	  better	  survive	  a	  crisis	  and	  also	  maintain	  employment	  by	  cutting	  own	  real	  income	  during	  economic	  crisis	  (Tremlett 2013).	  They	  can	  also	  reduce	  wages	  and	  other	  benefits	  to	  redirect	  these	  funds	  to	  investment	  purposes,	  providing	  cooperatives	  with	  an	  additional	  degree	  of	  freedom	  in	  the	  investment	  domain.	  
Cooperatives,	  Income,	  and	  Surplus	  Because	  of	  the	  potential	  efficiency	  advantage	  of	  cooperatives	  over	  independent	  small	  farms,	  they	  should	  yield	  higher	  incomes	  to	  farmers	  than	  the	  independent	  farmers	  might	  accrue,	  acting	  independently,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  extent	  of	  poverty	  reduction	  than	  might	  otherwise	  occur.	  Based	  on	  implementing	  and	  adhering	  to	  principles	  of	  cooperative	  governance,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	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cooperative	  members	  should,	  on	  average,	  earn	  higher	  incomes	  than	  small	  independent	  farmers.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  cooperatives	  capturing	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  as	  well	  as	  reducing	  pertinent	  transaction	  costs.	  Moreover,	  given	  effort	  variability,	  cooperatives	  can	  generate	  higher	  levels	  of	  x-­‐efficiency,	  allowing	  for	  both	  higher	  income	  and	  cost	  competitiveness.	  One	  would	  also	  expect	  that	  cooperatives	  will	  yield	  higher	  incomes	  to	  rural	  agricultural	  workers	  (when	  they	  are	  cooperative	  members)	  than	  they	  would	  earn	  as	  employees	  of	  privately-­‐owned	  farms	  large	  or	  small.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  and	  affected	  by	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  rural	  workers	  and	  related	  to	  this	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  labor	  organizations	  –are	  rural	  workers	  organized	  in	  unions,	  for	  example.	  To	  extent	  that	  farm	  workers	  have	  few	  legal	  rights	  to	  organize	  one	  would	  expect,	  based	  on	  the	  generalized	  x-­‐efficiency	  theory	  discussed	  above,	  farm	  workers	  would	  be	  relatively	  low	  paid,	  unless	  employers	  are	  sympathetic	  with	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  their	  employees	  through	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  sentiments	  and	  responsibility.	  So,	  improved	  bargaining	  power	  can	  provide	  farm	  workers	  with	  higher	  income	  and	  incentivize	  higher	  level	  of	  x-­‐efficiency	  in	  the	  larger	  IOF.	  But	  being	  part	  of	  a	  cooperative	  provides	  farm	  laborers	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  achieve	  higher	  levels	  of	  material	  wellbeing	  given	  the	  innate	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism,	  if	  enforced,	  in	  the	  cooperative	  organization	  form.	  	  It	  is	  important	  note	  that	  the	  higher	  productivity	  in	  cooperatives	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  smaller	  farms,	  not	  only	  allows	  for	  higher	  income	  to	  farmers	  but	  higher	  levels	  of	  surplus—a	  residual	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  investment.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  returned	  to	  members	  as	  a	  bonus	  or	  dividend	  or	  invested	  in	  ones	  community.	  The	  cooperative	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also	  has	  potentially	  an	  efficiency	  advantage	  over	  the	  larger	  farm	  through	  x-­‐efficiency	  and	  it’s	  greater	  capacity	  to	  reduce	  transactions	  cost	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  opportunism	  with	  guile.	  The	  higher	  productivity	  of	  the	  cooperative	  can	  generate	  a	  higher	  surplus,	  even	  when	  cooperators	  are	  paid	  more	  than	  wage	  laborers.	  To	  some	  extent	  that	  surplus	  is	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  the	  compensation	  directed	  to	  management	  included	  CEOs	  and	  CFOs.	  One	  advantage	  of	  cooperatives	  is	  such	  payments	  can	  be	  significantly	  less	  than	  what	  are	  paid	  by	  IOF—much	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  cooperatives	  apply	  principles	  of	  equity	  and	  fairness	  to	  their	  governance	  structure	  and	  practice.	  But	  in	  principle,	  cooperatives	  are	  not	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  providing	  internal	  sources	  of	  income	  for	  investment	  purposes.	  Of	  course,	  some	  cooperatives	  are	  turning	  to	  the	  market	  or	  government	  to	  source	  funds	  for	  investment.	  	  Some	  these	  points	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  6.	  The	  small	  farm	  is	  the	  weakest	  economic	  link	  in	  the	  system	  with	  regards	  to	  surplus	  generation.	  But	  the	  unlike	  in	  what	  would	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  traditional	  economic	  model,	  the	  cooperative	  is	  not	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  larger	  farms.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  cooperatives	  have	  an	  advantage,	  this	  is	  related	  to	  both	  higher	  levels	  of	  efficiency	  and	  a	  lesser	  share	  of	  income	  going	  to	  management.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  evidence	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  viability	  and	  the	  sustainability	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives.	  This	  needs	  to	  be	  and	  is	  modeled	  in	  this	  paper.	  This	  includes	  specifying	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  cooperatives	  can	  be	  established	  and	  fostered.	  We	  employ	  institutional	  analysis,	  x-­‐efficiency	  theory,	  efficiency	  wage	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theory,	  and	  transaction	  cost	  analysis,	  to	  this	  end.	  Cooperatives	  are	  not	  necessarily	  superior	  to	  IOF	  in	  terms	  of	  competitive	  economic	  entities.	  But	  cooperatives	  should	  not	  be	  modeled	  as	  a	  high	  cost	  alternative	  to	  IOF	  firms.	  Cooperative	  provides	  a	  viable	  alternative	  to	  the	  typically	  hierarchical	  IOF.	  Cooperative	  provides	  small	  farmers	  as	  well	  as	  agricultural	  workers	  with	  the	  means	  to	  capture	  economics	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  as	  well	  as	  to	  reduce	  transaction	  costs	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  larger	  privately-­‐owned	  farm.	  In	  addition,	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  can	  better	  and	  more	  easily	  achieve	  higher	  levels	  of	  x-­‐efficiency	  and	  reduce	  transaction	  costs	  related	  to	  opportunism	  with	  guile.	  This	  is	  related,	  in	  theory,	  on	  the	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  cooperative.	  Cooperatives	  also	  provide	  advantages	  in	  terms	  the	  income	  that	  can	  be	  secured	  at	  lost	  cost	  by	  members.	  Cooperative	  members,	  themselves	  decide	  the	  share	  of	  total	  output,	  inclusive	  of	  surplus,	  that	  they	  will	  secure.	  In	  the	  IOF,	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  is	  determined	  owners	  who	  usually	  are	  delinked	  from	  members	  in	  terms	  of	  preferences	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economic	  pie.	  In	  the	  IOF,	  higher	  shares	  of	  the	  total	  output	  depends	  on	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  workers,	  which	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  laws	  related	  to	  union	  organization	  and	  collective	  bargaining	  being	  conducive	  to	  such	  collective	  action.	  Also	  cooperatives	  have	  additional	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  able	  allocate	  income	  away	  from	  member	  payments	  or	  wages	  to	  investment	  as	  part	  of	  the	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Given	  that	  this	  is	  self-­‐exploitation	  there	  would	  be	  no	  expected	  negative	  effect	  on	  x-­‐efficiency	  (efficiency	  wage	  effect)	  as	  there	  would	  be	  in	  the	  IOF.	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Cooperatives	  will	  not	  be	  the	  choice	  of	  all	  agents	  given	  the	  risks	  involved	  of	  establishing	  and	  maintaining	  cooperatives.	  But	  if	  the	  cooperatives	  alternative	  is	  available	  and	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  sustainability	  and	  risk,	  it	  provides	  an	  option	  to	  famers	  and	  farm	  laborers	  and	  workers	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector.	  The	  cooperative	  option	  in	  governance,	  production,	  and	  income	  distribution	  needs	  to	  be	  appropriately	  framed	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  real	  options	  to	  decision	  makers.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  a	  world	  of	  imperfect,	  asymmetric,	  and	  biased	  information.	  Overall,	  the	  viability	  of	  cooperative	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  institutional	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  within	  which	  cooperatives	  must	  operate.	  But	  the	  same	  is	  the	  case	  of	  IOF.	  If	  the	  institutional	  parameters	  are	  not	  appropriate,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  establish	  cooperatives,	  and	  cooperatives	  can	  be	  squeezed	  out	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  for	  institutional	  as	  opposed	  to	  economic	  efficiency	  reason.	  Therefore,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  an	  equal	  institutional	  playing	  field	  between	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  and	  IOF	  in	  agriculture	  must	  exist	  for	  cooperatives	  to	  become	  a	  viable	  and	  plausible	  choice	  amongst	  farmers	  and	  farm	  workers.	  	  The	  predicted	  advantages	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  are	  very	  much	  a	  function	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  and	  extent	  to	  which	  cooperative	  principles	  are	  employed	  to	  underpin	  cooperative	  governance.	  Transparency	  and	  accountability	  are	  critically	  ingredients	  cooperative	  success.	  Also,	  important	  is	  having	  a	  robust	  and	  tested	  business	  plan	  and	  competent	  and	  qualified	  individuals	  leading	  the	  organization—just	  like	  an	  IOF.	  Cooperatives	  typically	  do	  not	  survive	  if	  they	  are	  economically	  poorly	  management	  and	  build	  upon	  an	  unsustainable	  business	  plan.	  The	  latter	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  cooperative	  principles,	  but	  fits	  into	  any	  model	  of	  democratic	  governance.	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